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1 Introduction
A “stopping rule” in a sequential experiment is a rule or procedure for de-
termining when the experiment should end.1 For example, consider a pair
of experiments designed to obtain evidence about the proportion of fruit
flies in a given population with red eyes [Savage, 1962, pp. 17–8]. In both
experiments, flies are caught, observed, and released sequentially and fairly,
reporting in the end the number of red-eyed flies. In the first, the experiment
is designed to stop after observing 100 flies, while the second is designed to
stop after observing 6 red-eyed flies. In general the data from these experi-
ments could be very different, but it is also possible that they be the same:
in this case, 100 total flies would be observed in both experiments, of which
6 (including the last) would have red eyes. Is the evidence that each of the
two would then provide for or against an hypothesis about the proportion of
red-eyed flies the same?
The stopping rule principle (SRP) states that this is so:
Stopping Rule Principle: The evidential relationship between the data
from a completed sequential experiment and a statistical hypothesis
does not ever depend on the experiment’s stopping rule.2
1Despite their name, sequential experiments need not involve any robust experimenter
control or manipulation.
2Technically, this is restricted to non-informative stopping rules, ones which when
learned provide no more information about the hypothesis of interest than the data them-
selves. All parties are in agreement that the SRP does not apply for informative stopping
rules. See Raiffa and Shlaifer [1961, pp. 36–42] and Berger and Wolpert [1988, §4.2.7] for
formal definitions, examples, and discussion.
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So, according to the SRP, the same data should yield the same evidence,
regardless of which stopping rule was used. Adherents of the SRP typically
apply it to experiments with complicated or ambiguous stopping rules, ana-
lyzing the experiment as if it were based instead on a simpler fixed stopping
rule. Thus, according to this strategy, if you accept the SRP, “It is not even
necessary that you stop according to a plan. You may stop when tired, when
interrupted by your telephone, when you run our of money, when you have
the casual impression that you have enough data to prove your point, and so
on” [Edwards et al., 1963, p. 239].
As I elaborate in section 2, many Bayesian statistical methods satisfy the
SRP insofar as they assess evidence for hypotheses in terms of their prior and
posterior probabilities, which are invariant under different stopping rules for
experiments producing the same data. On the other hand, classical statistical
methods (whether Fisherian or Neyman-Pearsonian) do not, insofar as they
rely on test statistics whose values depend on the probability distribution
of possible—not just actual—data, and clearly two sequential experiments’
possible outcomes need not be the same. Thus the SRP, along with the
so-called likelihood principle [Birnbaum, 1962, Berger and Wolpert, 1988],
which entails it, is a central point of contention between the two schools
of evidence and statistical inference—they disagree about the evidential rel-
evance of modal features of the experimental design and process of data
collection.3
But as authors defending both the Bayesian [Sprenger, 2009, p. 639] and
classical [Mayo, 1996, pp. 348, 351, 357] perspectives acknowledge, arguing
for the SRP because it follows from a framework for understanding statistical
evidence does little to convince others who have accepted a different frame-
work with different conclusions. Rather, it may be more productive to pro-
vide independent arguments for or against the SRP—arguments that do not
depend on adopting such a framework, besides having different premises—
which in turn provide argumentative support for or against broader statisti-
cal frameworks, according to how that framework entails or contradicts the
SRP. The main goal of this essay is to contend in sections 3–5 that five inde-
pendent arguments for the SRP advanced by statisticians and philosophers
fail to succeed. Viewing a stopping rule as an integral part of a sequential
3I have chosen to focus on the SRP rather than the likelihood principle in this essay
because of its concreteness and the arguments found in the literature concerning it in
particular.
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experiment’s design, though not necessary to show this, makes certain as-
pects of my contentions more readily comprehensible. Consequently, these
arguments do not support adopting standard versions of Bayesianism over
classical statistical methods.
The first class of arguments, considered in section 3, conclude that re-
jecting the SRP leads to an unacceptable sort of subjectivity in statistical
inference; these include the arguments from intentions (section 3.1) and de-
ception (section 3.2). I respond that either the sort of subjectivity charged
is entirely acceptable if granted, in the former case, or unfounded, in the
latter. The second class, considered in section 4, argues from the practical
undesirability of rejecting the SRP (section 4.1), or the practical desirability
of the consequences of it (section 4.2). These arguments commit to false
premises or argumentative gaps that have little hope of being filled with-
out assuming an evidential framework. The last, more technical argument
I consider, seeks to show that rejecting the SRP entails untoward decision-
theoretic consequences. I sharpen this argument in section 5, only to show
that it highlights a general problem with a using fixed-level tests within
Neyman-Pearson testing, not to any generic position that rejects the SRP.
All of these arguments seek to establish the evidential irrelevance of (non-
informative) stopping rules, but this thesis (the SRP) does not exhaust de-
bates about them. For instance, even if one does not accept the SRP, one can
still develop arguments delimiting when stopping rules matter evidentially,
or when one’s attitude towards them depend on specific practical rather than
evidential purposes. Such arguments are beyond the scope of the present es-
say, although I return to some possible connections with them in section 6,
where I also conclude with some reflection on future investigation of other
independent arguments for and against the SRP.
2 The Stopping Rule Principle in Bayesian
and Classical Statistics
Recall the two fly-sampling experiments introduced at the beginning of sec-
tion 1 and let θ ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of white-eyed flies in the fruit
fly population of interest. Furthermore, assume each catch is statistically
independent of each other, and that the population of flies does not change
during the experiment (i.e., no births or deaths). Then the statistical models
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for the two experiments may be described as follows:
1. Observe N flies. The probability of observing W1 white-eyed flies is
then
Pθ(W1) =
(
N
W1
)
θW1(1− θ)N−W1 . (1)
2. Continue observing until R red-eyed flies have been caught.
Pθ(W2) =
(
W2 +R− 1
W2
)
θW2(1− θ)R. (2)
Note that the number of white- and red-eyed flies caught in both experiments
will be the same if and only if W1 = W2 and W2 + R = N . In this case,
Pθ(W1)/Pθ(W2) =
(
N
W1
)
/
(
N−1
W2
)
, which is a constant. In what follows I assume
these equalities.
A Bayesian analysis of these experiments assumes a prior probability
P (θ) for the population proportions and sets P (Wi|θ) = Pθ(Wi) for i = 1, 2.
When the likelihoods Pθ(W1) and Pθ(W2) are proportional, as they are in
the case at hand, then from the same prior probabilities P (θ), each entails
by Bayes’ theorem the same posterior probabilities, P (θ|W1) = P (θ|W2). So,
following Steel [2003, §4], we may note that any Bayesian measure of evidence
for an hypothesis of interest that depends only on the prior and posterior
probabilities for that hypothesis must satisfy the SRP.4 For example, if one
understands evidence in terms of confirmation by data Wi [Huber, n.d., §6b],
both the log-ratio confirmation measure
r(Wi, θ) = ln
(
P (Wi|θ)
P (θ)
)
(3)
and the log-likelihood confirmation measure
l(Wi, θ) = ln
(
P (Wi|θ)
P (Wi|¬θ)
)
(4)
4Arguments related to this had been much earlier stated [Edwards et al., 1963, p. 237],
its conclusion well-known [Savage, 1962, p. 17], but Steel [2003] was, as far as I know, the
first to point out the implicit assumption about the dependence of the evidential measure
on only the priors and posteriors. (This is not because, e.g., Savage and others might
have been considered to focus more on decision rather than evidence; they just seemed
to assume as a matter of course that evidence for a hypothesis provided by data is given
by the posterior probability for that hypothesis.) When this assumption does not hold,
Bayesian measures of evidence need not satisfy the SRP.
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have this property. (To see this in the latter case, note that by Bayes’
theorem, P (Wi|¬θ) = P (¬θ|Wi)/P (¬θ) = (1− P (θ|Wi))/(1− P (θ)).)
By contrast, classical statistical methods, whether Fisherian or Neyman-
Pearsonian, will not satisfy the SRP, insofar as they rely on data whose
values depend on the probability distribution of possible—not just actual—
data, and clearly the two sequential experiments’ possible outcomes are not
the same. Explicitly, if data wi are recorded, they will calculate for any
hypothesis θ the p-value Pθ(Wi ≥ wi), the probability of measuring data at
least as extreme (i.e., unlikely) as the data actually measured. The Fisherian
then takes the p-value as a measure of disconfirmation for θ, with smaller
values indicating higher disconfirmation [Howson and Urbach, 2006, Ch. 5.b].
Thus, data are evidence against that hypothesis to the extent that the data
actually measured were extreme or unlikely.
In Neyman-Pearson testing, one sets a threshold value α, called the sig-
nificance level or type I error rate of the test, so that if the p-value falls
below it, the hypothesis is “rejected” but is “accepted” otherwise [Howson
and Urbach, 2006, Ch. 5.c]. Additionally, one must select a test statistic
that minimizes the probability of acceptance when the hypothesis is actually
false, called the type II error rate of the test. These decisions are supposed
to be tied with particular actions, hence do not in general have a substan-
tive epistemic import. Consequently, many scientists practice a hybrid of
the two types of testing, according to which “rejection” is interpreted as a
type of qualitative disconfirmation, while “acceptance” is only interpreted as
neither confirmation nor disconfirmation [Mayo, 1996, Ch. 11]. (For further
discussion of classical statistical testing, see, e.g., Romeijn [2017, §3.1.1].)
For concreteness, suppose that we are interested in testing whether white-
and red-eyed flies are equally represented (θ = 1/2), and that N = 12 for
the first experiment while R = 3 for the second—i.e., w1 = w2 = 9.
5 Then
the p-values for the two sequential experiments come out as
P1/2(W1 ≥ 9) =
12∑
w1=9
(
12
w1
)(
1
2
)w1 (
1− 1
2
)12−w1
≈ 0.07, (5)
P1/2(W2 ≥ 9) =
∞∑
w2=9
(
w2 + 3− 1
w2
)(
1
2
)w2 (
1− 1
2
)3
≈ 0.03 (6)
5The example is an amalgam of those by Savage [1962, pp. 17–8] and Mayo and Kruse
[2001, pp. 387–8].
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Therefore a Fisherian test of significance would quantify the evidential value
of the two experiments differently. Further, a Neyman-Pearson test of the
hypothesis that θ = 1/2 at significance level α = 0.05, the most commonly
selected value, would lead to its rejection (disconfirmation) with the second
experiment but not with the first.
If one were to adopt one or the other of these frameworks, one would
commit oneself for or against the SRP. But if one has not yet made such a
commitment, what can be said? There are other arguments that have been
made for the SRP independent of these frameworks, arguments to which I
now turn.
3 The Arguments from Intentions and De-
ception
In this section and the next, I describe and rebut four sorts of arguments for
the SRP. The two arguments in this section—from intentions (section 3.1)
and from deception (section 3.2)—both take the form of a modus tollens: a
failure to adopt the SRP leads to failure of scientific objectivity, i.e., the free-
dom of the epistemic import of scientific evidence from the personal biases,
conventions, and choices of researchers producing the evidence [Reiss and
Sprenger, 2017, §4], with deleterious consequences for the scientific enter-
prise’s ability to self-correct; since scientific objectivity in this sense should
be upheld, the SRP should be adopted. For present purposes, I shall grant
the second premise, focusing my criticism on the first. Part of my strategy
will be to stress what all parties to the debate already acknowledge, that
stopping rules are a part of the design of an experiment. In doing so I will
often use the following heuristic: replace mentions of “stopping rules” in an
argument for the first premise with mentions of “experimental design”. This
isn’t absolutely necessary in order to identify what goes wrong with those ar-
guments, but I have found it helpful nonetheless to demystify stopping rules,
and hope the reader does as well.
3.1 The Argument from Intentions
Perhaps the most well-known argument for the SRP is the argument from
intentions. Savage [1962, p. 76] describes the gist of the argument thus, as
he heard it from G. A. Barnard in 1952:
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The design of a sequential experiment is, in the last analysis,
what the experimenter actually intended to do. His intention is
locked up inside his head and cannot be known to those who have
to judge the experiment.6
Because of these “hidden intentions,” [Hacking, 1965, p. 109], it is therefore
charged that violating the SRP introduces worrisome subjectivity about the
experimenter’s mental states into statistical analysis [Berger and Wolpert,
1988, p. 78]. In particular, classical statistics is supposed to be less objective
than its Bayesian alternative because “Classical procedures . . . insist that
the intentions of the experimenter are crucial to the interpretation of data”
[Edwards et al., 1963, p. 239], and unlike with the subjectivity associated
with Bayesian priors, it is neither explicit nor is it “the kind of subjectivity
that may be ‘washed out’ by repeated testing” [Steele, 2013, p. 945].
The argument from intentions takes as a premise the unverifiability of an
experimenter’s state of intention, as a part of their mental state. Because
the experiment’s stopping rule, ultimately, is a part of that intention, it
too is unverifiable. But how hidden are intentions, really? Advocates of
the argument from intentions typically take this to be so obvious as to be
without need of supporting argument,7 but in fact, there is overwhelming
support that the relevant sort of intentions are just as verifiable as many other
aspects of mental life. I shall present two related lines of support for this:
first, in various disciplines—law, linguistics, and psychology—intent to act
or behave in a certain way is relevant to their concerns. Consequently, they
have methods to establish—that is, verify—ascriptions of intent. Second,
in the experimental sciences in particular, there are many ways of verifying
intent that require much less sophistication.
In most systems of criminal law, the mode, or level, of culpability for a
conventional crime, which determines sentencing guidelines and other degrees
of punishment, depends on mens rea, or the intentional mental state of the
perpetrator [Fletcher, 1998]. Establishing various types of intent with regard
to the criteria of criminal action (actus reus) is a necessary and routine part of
criminal prosecution, usually involving careful assessment of the defendant’s
claims about their intent as well as the reasonably expected inevitable (or
6Savage continues: “Never having been comfortable with that argument, I am not
advancing it myself.” However, he does shortly thereafter [Edwards et al., 1963]. (See also
the discussion by Mayo [1996, p. 346–7].)
7Perhaps it’s a hangover from radical behaviorism?
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even probable) consequences of their observed actions. Thus, even when
justice for individuals and societies is at stake and consequences are the
highest, intent is not something at all unverifiable or subjective, but can be
established through the usual evidence one gathers to establish the mental
state of another.
Competent speakers of a particular language use similar everyday meth-
ods to infer the meaning of utterances. For example, to understand whether
a speaker asking “Can you lift your feet?” either inquires about mobility or
issues a request depends on contextual features that any language user with
pragmatic competence will recognize—e.g., the speaker’s operation of a vac-
uum cleaner. Moreover, recognizing a speaker’s intentions goes beyond syn-
tactic competence and is necessary for fluency in a second language [Koike,
1989]. Far from being unverifiable, correctly ascribing intent is essential for
interpersonal communication and coordination of action.
Finally, in cases where more extreme precision is needed, psychologists
have developed entire empirical research programs dedicated to describing
in fine detail the interrelations between attitude, norms, motivations, inten-
tions, and actions [Fishbein and Azjen, 1975, Azjen and Fishbein, 1980]. One
of the most influential of these is the Theory of Planned Behavior [Azjen,
1985, 1991], which also includes perceived behavioral control. This has been
successful enough to lead to tools for both prediction and control of behavior,
such as in matters of health and public policy [Fishbein and Azjen, 2011]. In
all this research, intentions are measured through carefully designed and cali-
brated questionnaires asking directly about introspected intention, behavior,
and other related factors, which, when modeled correctly, have been verified
to correlate with actual behavior appropriately cued.8
The purpose of this cursory review of three fields’ involvement regularly
establishing intent is not to endorse deferentially all the variegated details
of their involvement, but rather show merely that there is quite substantial
evidence against the claim that intentions are unverifiable. In the face of this,
skeptics may always question whether these fields can really establish strong
enough evidence about intent to make it evidentially relevant. But without
any details of such a counterargument provided, it is hard to see it as anything
beyond a form of generalized and self-defeating skepticism. If reported and
8Perhaps it goes without saying, but this is emphatically not a fringe or speculative
research program in psychology: as of the end of September, 2018, when this passage
was written, these five works collectively have over 176,000 citations according to Google
Scholar.
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assessed intent to stop an experiment is not considered verifiable according
to the usual means, why not extend the same conclusion to reports of the
data itself? I take it that this position has already been ceded by advocates
of the SRP.
What implications therefore does this entail for the argument from inten-
tions? Following the heuristic proposed at the beginning of this section leads
us to the following contrast:
[The experimenter’s experimental design] is locked up inside his
head and cannot be known to those who have to judge the exper-
iment.
This clearly isn’t so, as detailed descriptions of experimental procedures, in-
cluding those that encompass what might have been observed but was not,
are routine in experimental science. The point is not merely that stopping
rules are typically reported in practice, but that the stopping rule for an
experiment can be and usually is conclusively verifiable, which confutes the
claim that stopping rules are unverifiable or hidden for experiments. Good
experimental practice recognizes both the need to make this possibility an
actuality in reporting an experiment, as well as its evidential relevance. Typ-
ically an experimenter is verily obligated to report all the details of the de-
sign that are relevant for replications thereof, including the stopping rule, as
Gillies [1990, p. 95] has emphasized.
Howson and Urbach [2006, p. 160] have objected that, because not all
properties of an experiment need be similar in a replication—e.g., the color
of the experimenter’s shoes—an independent reason is needed to understand
the stopping rule as an evidentially relevant part of the experimental design.9
A successful independent argument against the SRP could provide such a
reason, but such an argument is yet forthcoming, they claim. It’s beyond the
scope of the present essay to evaluate whether there are such arguments—
see section 6 for a reference to one prospect. However, this objection cuts
both ways: not having a reason to include the stopping rule as evidentially
relevant is not itself a reason to exclude it as evidentially irrelevant. In other
words, not having a specific prescription about whether stopping rules are
included in the evidentially relevant part of the description of experiments is
not the same as a permission to exclude that information as irrelevant.
9They also point out that replication is not necessary in some sciences, but this is
besides the point: as long as it is a concern in some sciences, it helps block the argument
from intentions.
9
Howson and Urbach [2006, pp. 158–9] present a variation of the argument
from intentions that deserves a separate response. They invite the reader
to imagine that “two scientists collaborate in a trial [i.e., an experiment],
but are privately intent on different stopping rules; by chance, no conflict
arises, and the result satisfies both” [Howson and Urbach, 2006, p. 158]. For
example, they could be observing the eye color of flies, as in the example
from section 2, with one intent on stopping after observing 12 flies, while the
other intent on stopping after observing 3 red-eyed flies. In such a situation it
is ambiguous what the true stopping rule is—which scientist would prevail if
they were to run into conflict about stopping the experiment?—yet it seems,
all else being equal, that one ought to be able to interpret the resulting data
evidentially. They write in conclusion: “We suggest that such information
about experimenters’ subjective intentions [. . . ] has no inductive relevance
whatever in this context” [Howson and Urbach, 2006, p. 158, emphs. orig.].
First, I note that on logical grounds alone this argument cannot be a
modus tollens, as described at the beginning of this section, for the SRP.
Because the SRP has the logical form of a negated existential claim, one
cannot argue for it in a modus tollens by providing a counterexample to a
universal claim. In a word, producing an example in which the stopping rule
does not matter evidentially does not show that it never does.
Second, the argument does not even establish that the stopping rule some-
times does not matter evidentially to a hypothesis. This is because it con-
flates ambiguity with inscrutability or irrelevance. As it was described, the
only definite stopping point for the experiment is when 12 observations have
been made, 3 of which (including the last one) were of red eyes. But this
does not imply directly the evidential irrelevance of the stopping rule, nor
the impossibility of making evidential claims from this experiment. An ad-
vocate for the evidential relevance of the stopping rule in this case may still
maintain that the data from the experiment bear evidentially, if ambiguously,
on the hypothesis of equal representation of white- and red-eyed flies. Such
an advocate can analyze the data according to different hypothetical plausi-
ble definite stopping rules, and present these analyses together, emphasizing
what they have in common. For example, if the scientific collaboration was
among peers, then due deference would likely have them stop the experi-
ment when one decides to. If they were not peers, deference in stopping the
experiment would go to the stopping rule of the epistemic superior. Such
pieces of information can help plausibly remove ambiguity from the eviden-
tial evaluation of the experiment, but even without them an advocate for the
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evidential relevance of stopping rules does not face an experimental outcome
with inscrutable evidence.10
3.2 The Argument from Deception
A different argument suggests that the absence of ways to account for inten-
tions blows a breach into the bulwark of the scientific community’s methods
for self-correction. It is thus a failure not of product objectivity, but pro-
cess objectivity [Reiss and Sprenger, 2017, §1]. For instance, Sprenger [2009,
p. 641] advances the following contrast.
Using fake data involves considerable risk: if continued replica-
tions fail to reproduce the results, our experimenter will lose all
her reputation. By contrast, she can never be charged for insin-
cerely reporting her intentions. The crucial point here is . . . that
the scientific community is unable to control whether these in-
tentions have been correctly reported.
In a reversal of what is sometimes charged of methods that obey the SRP
[Mayo and Kruse, 2001, Mayo, 1996, Ch. 10.3], the argument from decep-
tion advances that abandoning the SRP leads to problems with misleading
evidence, for experimenters can gain evidential advantage by reporting the
stopping rule for their experiment that maximizes (or minimized) the evi-
dential import of the experiment for a chosen hypothesis.
But is this so? Following the replacement heuristic for the experimenter
considering insincerity:
She can never be charged for insincerely reporting her [experi-
mental design]. The crucial point here is . . . that the scientific
community is unable to control whether these [experimental de-
signs] have been correctly reported.
10Another possible response, suggested by Livengood [2017], is that in fact two experi-
ments were being performed, since sometimes creative intentions can matter to what exists.
This would be the case when the design is part of the experiment itself, so that two dif-
ferent designs entail two different experiments. The evidential import of each experiment,
then, can be evaluated separately. It is not yet clear to me how one should understand
these two experiments with respect to the problem of use-novelty or double-counting of
data, so I won’t discuss it further.
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But this is contravened by examples from actual scientific controversies. For
example, Franklin [1994] describes the case of the alleged detection of grav-
itation waves by Joseph Weber in the 1960s and 1970s. After replication
attempts by many other groups, Weber’s claims were not substantiated, on
which the scientific community came to a consensus. Importantly, Weber
did not falsify data, but made his experimental design and data analysis
plan available, if not entirely in his publications, then through contacts with
other researchers. This design included rules for how to start and stop taking
data, and when to exclude outliers. By 1977, “he had lost all credibility as
far as gravity wave experiments were concerned” [Franklin, 2010, p. 126],
although that loss did not extend to other aspects of his work.11 So, similar
mechanisms for self-correction apply here for design as they do for the data
themselves, and the possibility of replication is precisely the most central
tool for doing so. If continuing replications using the reported experimental
design fail to reproduce relevantly similar result, the original experiment will
be discredited.
4 The Arguments from Impracticality andWaste
Another class of arguments against the SRP also take the form of a modus
tollens: a failure to adopt the SRP leads to pragmatic difficulties, e.g., un-
due burdens in performing or analyzing experiments or wasting valuable re-
sources; since these pragmatic difficulties are to be avoided, the SRP must
hold. These arguments thus involve two sorts of premises: a factual claim
that allowing for the evidential significance of any experiment’s stopping rule
leads to pragmatic woes, and a conditional claim along the lines that an ev-
idential principle—such as the denial of the SRP—holds only if it does not
lead to insuperable practical difficulties.
Although I have just framed this class of arguments in the indicative
mood, one can also read them as operating on a sort of meta-level about
evidential frameworks. On this version, one implicitly supposes that there
are different internally viable frameworks for evidence, some of which satisfy
the SRP and some of which do not. One is then interested in the exter-
nal question of choosing one framework over another, criteria for which can
11Although credibility can be considered a property of a scientist qua epistemic agent,
it seems more important in scientific endeavors as attached to particular claims; Shapin
[2010], for example, defends the particularity of credibility claims in science.
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well be practical [Carnap, 1950]. For such versions, the second premise of
the argument is normative, something like: one should adopt an evidential
principle only if it does not lead to insuperable practical difficulties.
In what follows, I consider and criticize two arguments of this form, those
from impracticality (section 4.1) and from waste (section 4.2). Their first,
descriptive premises are not in general true, while their second, conditional or
normative premises are charitably tacit—charitably, because without them,
these arguments would simply be fallacious ad consequentiam. Further, for
the argument from waste, it is hard to find any hint of how its second premises
could be motived without adopting a whole framework for evidential reason-
ing, such as a version of Bayesianism. Without articulating such a moti-
vation, its doesn’t provide independent reasons why undesirable pragmatic
consequences should lead to the adoption of an evidential or epistemological
principle.
4.1 The Argument from Impracticality
Sprenger [2009, p. 642] summarizes the argument from impracticality thus:
“Specifying the stopping rule in advance sounds good, but specifying the
correct, comprehensive stopping rule (which we need to interpret the results
properly) is practically impossible.” The difficulty is that “there will often be
unforeseen eventualities that crop up in sequential experimentation” [Berger
and Wolpert, 1988, p. 77] that the experimenter did not anticipate in the
description of the experiment’s stopping rule. This descriptive premise is
supposed to be the case for any experiment, so rejecting the SRP leads to
the infeasibility of the evidential evaluation of any sequential experiment.
If one then assumes that “ought” implies “feasible” and that one ought to
evaluate the evidential significance of each of our sequential experiments, the
conditional or normative premises, one then arrives at a contradiction.12
There are actually two versions of the argument from impracticality that
vary based on the reading of the first, descriptive premise. The stronger
version takes Sprenger’s asserted practical “impossibility” literally: what is
infeasible is a literally correct and comprehensive description of the condi-
tions under which an experiment would stop. For instance, what is the prob-
ability at any time that the experiment will stop due to a meteor striking
12Except for insisting on modifications of feasibility to approximate feasibility, I will not
challenge this premise further, although one could [Southwood, 2016].
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the laboratory building? Since this is admittedly practically impossible, the
conditional or normative premises entail that one is not obligated to specify
the stopping rule of an experiment. However, rejecting the SRP does not in
fact require such comprehensiveness.13 All that is needed is the probability
of the experiment stopping at a particular point in the sequences of trials.14
To illustrate this, consider again the fly-sampling experiments from section
2. Just as it isn’t necessary to describe how each fly is physically caught
from and released to the population to analyze the data from each, only the
probabilities (including probabilistic independences) of the outcomes, so too
it isn’t necessary to describe just all the ways an experiment could stop, just
the probabilities that it does so at various steps in the experiment.
This leads to the weaker version of the argument from impracticality,
according to which the practical difficulty comes not from the existence of
unforeseen ways in which the experiment could end, but from the infeasibility
of determining the probabilities of these ways. But conceding this practical
impossibility does not entail the impossibility of taking the evidential bearing
of stopping rules into account within a good approximation. Indeed, the
conditional or normative premise about evaluating the evidential significance
of each of our sequential experiments should allow for that evaluation to be
approximate.
When one had good reason to believe that the probabilities of unex-
pected stopping are small, one can idealize the stopping rule as something
much simpler. For example, in the calculations of likelihood of the eye color
experiment, suppose the probability that it will definitely halt due to fac-
tors largely independent of the data collected—meteors hitting the building,
etc.—is given by φ. Then the “fixed-N” sample experiment has a probability
of collecting W1 white-eyed flies and N −W1 = R1 red-eyed flies given by
Pθ(W1) = Pθ,φ(W1|R1 +W1 = N)Pφ(R1 +W1 = N)
=
(
N
W1
)
θW1(1− θ)N−W1(1− φ)N .
13The issue of “correctness” is actually orthogonal to the issues here and concerns more
whether the statistical model and experimental design for the sequential experiment were
misspecified.
14Steele [2013, p. 945] suggests that all one needs to do is include the different stopping
events in the total outcome space for the experiment, but this does not rebut the argument
against the practical impossibility of specifying what these all are, as she seems to suggest.
14
When φ is very small, as it often is, it may be idealized away without substan-
tial misrepresentation of the evidential import of the experiment’s result.15
The case is entirely analogous to cases of idealization from Newtonian
physics. In order to calculate the trajectory of a projectile, one needs to
determine all the forces on it at all times, as well as how the projectile deforms
in response to forces. But practically small forces on fairly rigid projectiles
can be neglected without significant loss. So, too, the tools of idealization
turns practical impossibility to practical possibility for statistical models.
Once cases such as this are admitted, the descriptive premise in the ar-
gument from impracticality no longer holds. Because it is not generally the
case that representing the probability of stopping, at least to a good approxi-
mation, is impractical, it cannot be that unfeasible demands to represent this
probability lead one to the SRP, i.e., to reject the stopping rule’s evidential
relevance in all cases. Of course, there are many examples of sequential exper-
iments with multiple complex stopping mechanisms, such as when a clinical
trial shows excess harm or benefit [Whitehead, 1997]. But the existence of
these examples is insufficient, logically, to prove any claim about the uni-
versal infeasibility of taking into account stopping rules, which is needed for
the form of the modus tollens argument. Moreover, it is doubtful that they
are as infeasible as sometimes complained: there is a voluminous literature,
initiated for the most part by Wald [1947], on how to model them properly
and understand their evidential relevance—see, e.g., Siegmund [1985] and
Whitehead [1997]. Claimants of impracticality or unfeasibility ignore about
75 years of developments at their peril.
One could admit these objections but then treat the argument from im-
practicality as a consideration in favor of an evidential framework that re-
quires fewer demands on researchers. Although taking into account the ev-
idential significance of stopping rules is feasible, it can still be subtle and
time-consuming. This version of the argument shades into a version of the
argument from waste, to which I turn attention presently.
4.2 The Argument from Waste
Not conforming our notions of evidence to the SRP, its advocates sometimes
contend, leads to wasted resources:
15One can also treat more complicated stopping rules [Raiffa and Shlaifer, 1961, pp. 39–
40].
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if we believe in the evidential, postexperimental relevance of the
stopping rule, then we have to be silent on the meaning of data
where the stopping rule is unavailable. But if we throw the data
into the trash bin, we give away a great deal of what reality tells
us. [Sprenger, 2009, p. 642]
In the most extreme case, “If the experimenter forgot to record the stopping
rule and then died, it is unappealing to have to guess his stopping rule in
order to conduct the [data] analysis” [Berger and Wolpert, 1988, p. 78]. By
contrast, for those who adopt the SRP,
This irrelevance of stopping rules to statistical inference restores
a simplicity and freedom to experimental design that had been
lost by classical emphasis on significance levels . . . Many exper-
imenters would like to feel free to collect data until they have
either conclusively proved their point, conclusively disproved it,
or run out of time, money, or patience. [Edwards et al., 1963,
p. 239]
The second, tacit premise seems to involve the concept of dominance. Under-
stood as a pure (non-normative) conditional, it might read: if an evidential
principle entails that, for any sequential experiment, its analysis according to
that principle would use or waste no more resources (and uses less or wastes
less on at least one occasion) than its analysis according to that principle’s
denial, then that principle is true.
This (non-normative) conditional premise is highly implausible. Its only
motivation, as far as I can see, would be to save the argument from waste
from committing an ad consequentiam fallacy. In general just because data
analysis would be simplified or resources less wasted by following the SRP
doesn’t make it true.16 Thus it is more charitable to interpret the second,
tacit premise normatively: if a framework for evaluating evidential entails
that, for any sequential experiment, its analysis within that framework would
use or waste no more resources (and uses less or wastes less on at least one
occasion) than its analysis according to some other framework, then one
should adopt that framework. Though much more plausible, this version of
the premise also has its problems, to which I will return after discussing the
first, descriptive premise.
16See also the discussion in Mayo [1996, p. 350–1].
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Like with the argument from impracticality, there are two versions of the
argument from waste that vary based on the reading of this first premise. The
stronger version takes literally Sprenger’s assertion that declining to evaluate
data from a sequential experiment whose stopping rule is unknown is a kind
of evidential waste. Cohen [2010, p. 234, emph. orig.] usefully analyzes
waste as “any process wherein something useful becomes less useful and that
produces less benefit than is lost—where benefit and usefulness are understood
with reference to the same metric”. Here, the data is supposed to be wasted
because its evidential use, e.g., in confirming or disconfirming hypotheses, is
lost unless it is analyzed. However, in order for declining to analyze the data
to count as an evidential loss, it must be evaluated with the same framework
according to which analyzing the data would count as an evidential gain.
But any such framework cannot be one according to which the stopping rule
is evidentially relevant, for within such a framework, “reality” doesn’t “tell
us” anything definite through a data set without taking into account the
stopping rule. Thus, this strong version of the first, descriptive premise begs
the question for the SRP.
Another problem with the stronger version of this premise is that it seems
to assume that experimenters working in an evidential framework in which
stopping rules are relevant never have recourse to analyzing an experiment
if the stopping rule is not known. However, one can often contact the exper-
imenter or their colleagues or students by various means, complete a couple
data analyses conditional on different plausible stopping rules, or simply at-
tempt to replicate an experiment.17 Admittedly, these techniques require
more work and may involve more vagueness in justified conclusions than
those used within an evidential framework that accepts the SRP. This leads
to the weaker version of the first, descriptive premise, suggested more from
the quotations by Berger and Wolpert and Edwards et al.. According to this
version, adopting an evidential framework that makes stopping rules eviden-
tially relevant does not waste the evidential value of data, but rather requires
more cognitive resources to evaluate the data from any sequential experiment
17Data sets that are so intractable as to be insusceptible even to analyses conditional
on various plausible stopping rules, have, on our substitution heuristic, a substantial part
of their experimental design unarticulated. In such cases I do not see any necessity to
analyze them. But even if there were, and even setting aside the other problems with
the stronger version of the descriptive premise, establishing that there are some such
intractable examples is logically insufficient to establish the SRP, for the same reasons as
for the argument from impracticality discussed in section 4.1.
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than from within a framework that accepts the SRP.
I do not contest that adopting the SRP simplifies data analysis or that
cognitive effort is a relevant external criterion for adopting an evidential
framework. Indeed, it seems to me that this advantage, hence this version of
the argument from waste, is most convincing to applied researchers, among
the arguments I consider in this paper. But for a framework that adopts the
SRP to be truly considered less wasteful of cognitive resources than one that
does not—and here I return to the normative version of the second premise—
the two frameworks must be compared along more dimensions than just their
use of (cognitive) resources. As evidential frameworks, they must be apt, or
at least comparable in their aptness, for the same goals.
To illustrate, consider the following anarchist evidential framework: draw
whichever conclusions one wishes immediately from an experiment. Because
it requires essentially no cognitive resources at all, the normative version
of the dominance premise entails that one should adopt this evidential an-
archism over any otherwise reasonable alternative. One is driven to this
absurdity—I take it that all sides of the debates around the SRP are moti-
vated, if only implicitly, by a rejection of evidential anarchism—only because
that premise does not take into account other essential criteria for comparing
frameworks, such as their aptness for the particular tasks for which evidence
is fashioned.
This raises the pertinent question of whether two arbitrary evidential
frameworks, about which we have assumed only that they differ on the SRP,
must be fashioned for the same (external) tasks. Surprisingly, advocates
of the argument from waste seem to assume that they are, but surely this
is theft over honest toil. As Kelly [2016] describes, concepts of evidence
serve multiple roles, some complementary and some in tension: evidence can
be that which justifies belief, or according to which rational folk apportion
belief or determine action; it can also be that which confirms or corroborates
a hypothesis, as a guide to truth; and it can be whatever objectively (or
intersubjectively) arbitrates between competing hypotheses. Assuming that
any two evidential frameworks are arranged for the same myriad roles is
implausible, and I know of no reasons for it.
The upshot of these observations is that without further such reasons, the
argument from waste cannot succeed in establishing the SRP—without, at
least, abandoning the goal to give an argument for (or against) the SRP that
does not adopt any particular evidential framework. Typically, proponents
of this argument—Edwards et al. [1963], Berger and Wolpert [1988], and
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Sprenger [2009] included—aim to compare not arbitrary evidential frame-
works but ones using concepts from Bayesian and classical statistics, respec-
tively. This at least allows more concrete traction on the problem of com-
parison, but gives up on the framework-independent arguments that have
been my focus in this essay. Nevertheless, these proponents too seem to as-
sume that these two feuding families of ideas also have the same goals. But
as Mayo [1996, Ch. 10] has forcefully argued, these goals are in fact quite
different: “the underlying rationale of a number of methodological rules [in
classical statistics] is the aim of reliability or severity in the sense I have
been advocating, yet that aim runs counter to the aim reflected in Bayesian
principles” [Mayo, 1996, p. 320]. Thus, if Mayo is right, without already
assuming the methodological aims of an evidential framework, the argument
from waste does not pronounce any clear verdict, even between Bayesian and
classical frameworks for statistical inference and evidence.
5 The Decision-Theoretic Argument
Sprenger [2009, pp. 645–7] has put forth an argument for the SRP quite
different from the previous ones, based on decision theory. Although the full
technical statement of the proposition used in the argument is quite involved,
the basic idea is simple: roughly, if one does not adopt the SRP in certain
circumstances, one is led to incoherence in the sense of having inconsistent
or irrational preferences.
In a bit more detail, Sprenger [2009, p. 645] assumes the framework of
Neyman-Pearson testing in which decisions about the acceptance and rejec-
tion of an hypothesis are made on the basis of the p-value of a statistic chosen
to minimize the type II error rate given a fixed type I error rate (significance
level). He further assumes that either type of error is worse, in terms of
its utility as a confirmational or inferential decision, than the correspond-
ing correct decision for a fixed truth or falsity of the hypothesis under test.
Next, he compares two decision rules for a given sequential experiment: one,
δS, which evaluates the Neyman-Pearson test for a specific hypothesis H0
against a specific alternative H1 according to the stopping rule actually used
in the experiment, and another, δτ , which does the same except according to
a fixed stopping rule τ . (For example, τ may indicate analyzing the data as
if it were collected according to a predetermined fixed sample size, regardless
of what the stopping rule actually was; by contrast, S indicates analyzing
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the data according to the actually used stopping rule.) Once one fixes the
data from the sequential experiment—but not the stopping rule—then either
δτ = 0 (“accept H0 and reject H1”) or δτ = 1 (“accept H1 and reject H0”).
Denoting R(θ, δ) as the risk, or expected loss, of making decision δ if θ, a
specific state of the world, is true, he proves that for all values of θ, either
R(θ, 0) < R(θ, δS) or R(θ, 1) < R(θ, δS). The important corollary is that
“Preferring δS over δτ = 0 and δτ = 1 leads to incoherence for any value of
[θ], in the sense that a Dutch book (namely, a sure loss) can be constructed
against these preferences” [Sprenger, 2009, p. 646].
But how successful is this as an argument independent of a framework
for statistics? Despite Sprenger’s insistence that he has demonstrated that
classical statisticians are thus “beaten in their own game” [Sprenger, 2009,
p. 645], classical statistical testing, Neyman-Pearson or otherwise, just isn’t
in the business of providing decision rules that are coherent in a Bayesian
sense—their own “game” involves procedures for minimizing error probabil-
ity, not updating coherent personal probability assignment to states of the
world or making bets or forecasts that minimize Bayes risk. One would ac-
cept Bayesian coherence as a desideratum if one already accepts the Bayesian
framework, but then if one is using typical methods in that framework, they
would already satisfy the SRP; why would a Bayesian be using Neyman-
Pearson testing?
Instead of dismissing Sprenger’s argument for committing a non sequitur
or begging the question, one can instead reconfigure it with more neutral as-
sumptions and inferences using the recent work of Malinksy [2015], who pro-
vides a way of transforming Bayesian coherence arguments against Neyman-
Pearson testing to ones whose conclusions are entirely stated within the
Neyman-Pearson framework. To do so, he introduces the concept of com-
bined risk. Consider a collection of n experiments labeled by an index
ai ∈ In = {a1, . . . , an} and concerning a common (parameter) space of dis-
joint hypotheses Θ, and let δ be a decision rule defined over the possible
outcomes of all of these experiments. Letting Rai(θ, δ) be the risk of experi-
ment ai when the hypothesis (state of the world) θ ∈ Θ obtains, the combined
risk of the collection In is then defined as RIn(θ, δ) =
∑n
i=1Rai(θ, δ).
Next he formulates a version of the dominance principle in classical deci-
sion theory naturally extended to the case of combined risk.
Dominance: Given a collection of n experiments labeled by an index in the
set I, if RI(θ, δ1) ≤ RI(θ, δ2) for all θ ∈ Θ, and the inequality is strict
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for some θ, prefer δ1 over δ2.
Finally, he shows how in these terms, one can interpret a key result of
Schervish et al. [2002] as implying that, for any Neyman-Pearson decision
rule, there exists a pair of other decision rules and a pair of experiments such
that performing the other decision rules respectively on the two experiments
has a lower combined risk than performing the Neyman-Pearson decision rule
on both. Thus, by dominance, preferring the Neyman-Pearson rule leads to
a contradiction.
In applying these ideas to decision rules involving stopping rules, it suf-
fices for the purposes at hand to do so for the specific case of Sprenger’s
argument. The key observation18 is that 1
2
R(θ, 0) + 1
2
R(θ, 1) < R(θ, δS),
hence R(θ, 0) +R(θ, 1) < 2R(θ, δS). Using Malinsky’s strategy, we can inter-
pret this as stating that given two identical experiments, the combined risk
of performing Neyman-Pearson testing according to the actual stopping rule
used on both is higher than that of performing the same testing according
to a fixed stopping rule entailing rejection on the one and acceptance on the
other. Thus, preferring to evaluate the test using the stopping rule actu-
ally used, as opposed to one fixed stopping rule for the first experiment and
another for the second, conflict with the dominance principle.
This is an improvement on Sprenger’s argument, for it does not presup-
pose the relevance of decision-theoretic concepts (such as coherence) foreign
to classical statistical testing. But even in this form, it has somewhat limited
scope. Unlike the arguments considered in sections 3 and 4, it can at most
establish that there are problems with denying the SRP within Neyman-
Pearson testing; it’s entirely compatible with the SRP being false in general.
Nevertheless, if one can establish that a major evidential framework that
rejects the SRP has internal problems, it might provide some (eliminative)
inductive support to evidential frameworks that accept the SRP, such as
certain versions of Bayesianism.
However, the decision-theoretic argument is not even successful at this
task. In the first place, it is well-acknowledged that Neyman-Pearson testing
is better interpreted as a procedure for making decisions rather than deter-
mining evidence for hypotheses [Mayo, 1996, Ch. 11], so proponents of clas-
sical statistical methods would view it as straw man for criticizing evidential
procedures that violate the SRP. Moreover, the problems that the decision-
theoretic argument captures for Neyman-Pearson testing are actually inde-
18Sprenger [2009, p. 647] attributes it to Teddy Seidenfeld.
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pendent of assumptions about the SRP. To see this, recall that argument
encoded the evidential relevance of the stopping rule for Neyman-Pearson
testing in the decision rule δS, which indicates a decision to analyze the data
according to the stopping rule actually used. The only features of δS used
in the proof by Sprenger [2009, p. 646] is that if δτ = 0 and H0 is true, then
there is a probability strictly between zero and one that δS = 0—i.e., that
the test correctly accepts H0—and similarity if δτ = 1 and H1 is true. Thus
the proof goes through unchanged if we replace δS by any decision rule with
this property, including one that satisfies the SRP. For example, consider
the rule δR according to which H0 is accepted (and H1 rejected) simpliciter
with probability p ∈ (0, 1) and rejected (with H1 accepted) with probabil-
ity 1 − p. Though not a very useful version of Neyman-Pearson testing, it
satisfies the SRP insofar as the stopping rule is irrelevant to the decision to
accepted or reject a hypothesis. Moreover, it conflicts with the dominance
principle just as δS does. Thus, while the decision-theoretic argument reveals
a problem with Neyman-Pearson testing, that problem does not follow from
any assumptions about the evidential significance of stopping rules.
Perhaps this should not be so surprising, for the method used in the proof
involves the fact, known at least since the work of Cox [1958], that one can
always find mixed tests that dominate a given Neyman-Pearson test, simply
because it arises from a fixed-level testing procedure—the test is chosen to
minimize type II error given a fixed type I error. This is certainly a prob-
lem for Neyman-Pearson testing, but arguably that procedure’s assumption
of fixed-level testing is not essential to the broader framework of classical
statistics. One can use the whole apparatus of testing while letting the sig-
nificance level vary according to certain features of the data. For example,
Berry and Viele [2008] construct a coherent decision rule—one not suscep-
tible to the type of argument under discussion—for the case of data from
normal distributions. In this case, the type I error rate (significance level)
drops monotonically as a function of sample size—see Malinksy [2015] for
further discussion. In sum, the problems that the decision-theoretic argu-
ment reveals arise from fixed-level testing, not (in)attention to stopping rule,
which is not an essential feature of classical statistical testing.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
I have rebutted five independent arguments for the SRP: the arguments from
intentions and deception (section 3), from impracticality and waste (section
4), and a decision-theoretic argument (section 5). In three of these (sections
3.1, 3.2, and 4.1), I employed a heuristic substitution of “experimental de-
sign” for “‘stopping rule” to reveal some of those arguments’ flaws. For the
last argument, originally due to Sprenger [2009], I suggested how it could
be improved using ideas from Malinksy [2015], but in the end it was still
unsuccessful in establishing the SRP. Thus, these arguments do not provide
independent support to typical Bayesian frameworks for statistical analysis.
These are certainly not the only independent arguments for the SRP. I
have not considered a different decision-theoretic argument by Berger and
Wolpert [1988, pp. 83–5], nor arguments that seek to establish the SRP
through arguments for the likelihood principle [Birnbaum, 1962, Berger and
Wolpert, 1988], which entails it.19 Nor have I considered arguments against
the SRP, such as the foregone conclusions argument [Mayo and Kruse, 2001,
Mayo, 1996, pp. 351–7] suggested by Armitage already in 1959 [Savage, 1962,
p. 72], much less attempts to deflect it [Backe, 1999] or explain it away [Steele,
2013, Gandenberger, 2015]. Since the foregone conclusions argument in par-
ticular is typically formulated within the framework of classical statistics, a
reformulation in framework-independent terms would be helpful to assess it
fairly. Here, the substitution heuristic may be useful, as it forces one to see
the stopping rule as an element of experimental design. Only once these ar-
guments have been made more precise can we be in a position to adequately
assess their strength against the SRP, as I have done here for the arguments
for it, freed from question-begging background assumptions. The result can
then provide support in debates about the proper framework or frameworks
for statistical evidence. If those frameworks permit the evidential relevance
of stopping rules, one can also turn to further practical questions, e.g., about
how much of a difference they make and the most economical way, in the
sense of the scientific cognitive economy, to bring nonideal practice closer to
ideal evidential principles. These tasks will be taken up in future work.
19As described in these references, the likelihood principle is equivalent to two other
principles of sufficiently and conditionality, respectively. Some arguments for the condi-
tionality principle are similar to those for the SRP.
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